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Smith and Rousseau, after Hume and Mandeville 
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* 
 
Introduction 
 
In writing the history of political thought there is a danger that one’s estimation of a 
thinker is unduly influenced by the subsequent reputation, no matter how well deserved, 
that the thinker has come to possess. This can lead not only to distorted and 
anachronistic readings of past texts, but also to mistakes about their significance to 
contemporaries. My aim in this paper is to suggest a particular case in which the 
subsequent eminence of a thinker may have clouded our assessment of how they were 
received by one of their sharpest contemporaries. The case in question is Adam Smith’s 
intellectual encounter with Jean-Jacques Rousseau.1  
Against the thrust of most of what has been written on this matter, I believe that 
Smith did not take Rousseau particularly seriously as an intellectual opponent, instead 
receiving his positions as neither novel nor uniquely challenging. This is revealed by 
returning to Smith’s intellectual context in the 1750s, when he both reviewed Rousseau’s 
Second Discourse and published his own Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), but where a 
proper appreciation of the significance of David Hume and Bernard Mandeville pushes 
Rousseau firmly into the background.   
This paper proceeds in four main sections. The first situates my argument by 
using the publication of István Hont’s 2009 Carlyle Lectures as a critical foil for 
interrogating the Smith-Rousseau interface. The second challenges the view that Smith 
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was impressed by Rousseau due to the latter’s conception of pity, by suggesting that 
Smith’s much richer British philosophical context meant that the Genevan’s intervention 
would have been received by him as far behind the best available English work. The 
third considers Smith’s distinction between praise and praiseworthiness, and argues that 
although this functions as a reply to Rousseau, its original target was Mandeville. The 
final section examines the role of utility, vanity, and economic consumption in the 
context of Smith’s paraphrasing of Rousseau’s rhetoric from the Second Discourse, but 
suggests that a careful reading indicates that Hume is the primary interlocutor, with 
Rousseau featuring more like collateral damage.  I conclude by indicating some of the 
wider implications of my re-evaluation. 
 
Smith and Rousseau: The Question of Influence 
 
My argument is indebted to the posthumous publication of Hont’s 2009 Carlyle Lectures 
as Politics in Commercial Society. My aim, however, is not to straightforwardly endorse or 
extend Hont’s positions, but to take his central point of departure and argue that if 
properly worked out it yields a very different picture of the Smith-Rousseau relationship 
to that which presently prevails. This may seem surprising, or even redundant, insofar as 
Hont already presents himself as offering a position distinct from that to be found in the 
existing scholarship. But where that difference lies is a matter that needs careful 
consideration, one we must review before proceeding. 
Hont claims that Rousseau is typically taken to be a fierce critic of commercial 
modernity, whilst Smith is standardly depicted as its defender (or apologist). Hont 
himself rejects this dichotomy: both Smith and Rousseau ought to be considered 
theorists of commercial society, who are attempting to explain its foundations, 
predicaments, and possibilities.2 Hont does not deny that Smith and Rousseau’s political 
visions are very different, but he does contend that they share the same, or at least very 
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similar, ‘theories of moral foundations’.3 Given this, Hont suggests that the interesting 
question is why their politics nonetheless diverged, and how each might be evaluated in 
the light of the other. Yet even if Hont’s analysis differs from what he presents as the 
inadequate traditional dichotomy, he shares with the established literature the view that 
Rousseau was important to Smith, and exercised meaningful influence on the 
development of his ideas. Hont does not state this as explicitly as, for example, Pierre 
Force, for whom Smith was an ‘admirer’ of Rousseau 4 , or Dennis Rasmussen, who 
claims that Smith took Rousseau’s arguments ‘quite seriously, for in his view they 
pointed to the deepest and seemingly most intractable problems of the emerging 
commercial societies of his time’5. But he does credit Rousseau’s concept of pity as 
leaving a direct mark on Smith’s thought, and suggests that crucial aspects of the Scot’s 
political system are specific replies to the Genevan.6 Overall, Hont agrees with most 
other commentators that when Smith read Rousseau, he registered him as a major 
intellectual interlocutor and challenger.  
Of course, believing that Rousseau influenced Smith by itself settles nothing of 
further significance. There is protracted debate about how Rousseau did so, to what 
extent and where Smith responded, and who had the better of things on a variety of 
intellectual fronts. Yet all of these further questions are affected by whether Smith did 
take Rousseau particularly seriously, and was in various ways preoccupied with 
responding to his challenge(s). If that turns out not to be so, or at least not in the regards 
often supposed, then the proffered answers will be in varying ways inadequate because 
the wrong starting questions will have been asked. To see why the wrong questions may 
indeed have been asked, we must bring the foundations of Hont’s own project more 
clearly into focus.  
The editors of Politics in Commercial Society suggest that a key difference between 
Hont’s analysis and the majority of the existing literature is that whereas the latter tends 
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to analyze Smith in ways that make him look more like Rousseau, Hont brings out the 
ways in which Rousseau resembles Smith.7 This is fair enough, but it is not the most 
illuminating way to draw the comparison. A more important difference between Hont 
and other commentators is that whilst the latter tend to compare Smith and Rousseau 
primarily as theorists of morality, Hont begins the analysis a step further back, with the 
question of sociability. A root-concept in eighteenth century debates on morality and 
politics, sociability (as Hont has shown elsewhere) was the foundational issue that had to 
be settled before anything else could be determined.8 Hont maintains that neither Smith 
nor Rousseau countenanced the idea that man was naturally sociable, and hence 
explaining the emergence of stable society required some appeal to artifice. We can 
therefore label both thinkers in this regard ‘epicureans’, albeit without expecting too 
much theoretical precision from that label.9 However – and as I argue below – when we 
more fully develop the claim that both Smith and Rousseau were primarily sociability 
theorists, pressure is put on the idea that Smith was seriously influenced or impressed by 
Rousseau. This is because Smith was the inheritor of an advanced British sociability 
discourse to which Rousseau had no access because he could not read English, and 
largely constructed his own intervention from a working out of Hobbes’s De Cive, and 
secondary discussions of Hobbes’s positions in French. 10  In other words, when 
encountering Rousseau in the mid-1750s, the Scott would have registered the Genevan 
as a highly able, but very behind-the-curve, thinker, any shared ‘epicureanism’ 
notwithstanding.  
It may nonetheless remain the case that there is much value to be had in 
comparing Smith and Rousseau’s positions, regardless of the question of influence. 
Hont’s own wider analysis of political, moral, and economic theory indicates as much, as 
do (for example) Ryan Patrick Hanley’s detailed and illuminating comparative studies of 
Smith and Rousseau, which typically proceed without putting heavy weight on matters of 
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influence. 11  Nonetheless our views on exactly how Smith and Rousseau should be 
compared, and what those comparisons ultimately yield, may come to change if we end 
up believing that one viewed the other’s positions as largely obsolete, or without special 
force. And there are ramifications for the wider conceptualization of the history of 
political thought in turn. The efforts of a so-called ‘Cambridge School’ notwithstanding, 
there is still typically held to be a canon of great historical political thinkers in the western 
tradition. Rousseau is most definitely a member. Smith, despite recent healthy interest in 
his political thought, is not typically granted inclusion. Yet the discovery that Smith was 
unimpressed by Rousseau is potentially disruptive to established evaluations, especially if 
we come to believe that Smith was right not to be impressed. In either case there follow 
implications not just for how we read Rousseau, but regarding what should count for 
inclusion in a canon, and whether such a thing should be thought to exist at all. Those 
are some of the wider matters raised. In the rest of my argument, however, I limit myself 
to making the case regarding (as I see it) Rousseau’s lack of serious influence upon or 
importance to Smith, leaving the further implications for another day. 
 
The Amiable Principle of Pity 
In 1756, Smith famously offered Scottish readers an extended consideration of 
Rousseau’s Second Discourse through a ‘Letter’ to the short-lived Edinburgh Review. 
Demonstrating Smith’s direct engagement with Rousseau’s ideas, the ‘Letter’ has perhaps 
unsurprisingly served as a principle source of evidence for the influence on, or 
importance of, Rousseau to Smith in recent discussions. 12  After calling for Scottish 
readers to extend their gaze both to English and French achievements in natural and 
moral philosophy, whilst indicating that the most exciting future advances were likely to 
come from the continent, Smith certainly dedicates the bulk of his ‘letter’ to summarizing 
(as he sees it) the key features of Rousseau’s Discourse, listing its main claims and 
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providing translations of three long passages from Part 2 of the work. But it is by no 
means obvious that in doing so Smith was signaling the particular importance, novelty, 
or urgency, of Rousseau’s intervention. Indeed he may be read as indicating precisely the 
opposite, once we unpack the content of his remarks in the context of 1750s British 
intellectual advances.  
Of especial importance is Smith’s declaration that ‘Whoever reads this last work 
with attention, will observe, that the second volume of the Fable of the Bees has given 
occasion to the system of Mr. Rousseau’. Yet despite drawing attention to this alleged 
connection, Smith also claimed that there was an important difference. Rousseau’s 
account differed from Mandeville’s insofar as it was ‘softened, improved, and 
embellished, and stript of all that tendency to corruption and licentiousness which has 
disgraced them in their original author’. The reason for this was that Rousseau 
maintained that the ‘amiable principle’ of pity was capable of producing all the virtues the 
reality of which Mandeville had denied.13 
Hont takes Smith’s zeroing-in upon pity as evidence that he was a fellow traveller 
in making the capacity for shared affective sentiment foundational for any satisfactory 
‘epicurean’ account of sociability. Hont must be correct that by 1755 Smith would have 
had the argument of TMS largely in place, hence his own system cannot have had its 
genesis in reading Rousseau. Instead, Hont suggests, when Smith read the Discourse this 
must have helped him ‘more easily decide that the way ahead was through the 
generalization of the pity model’.14 The problem with this latter claim is that although it is 
true when we restore the intellectual context – which Hont hints at, but does not explore 
– it turns out to be trivial. Yet that triviality in turn gives reason to suspect that when 
Smith encountered Rousseau’s ideas he cannot have registered them as especially 
important. 
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In Britain, debate over the capacity to feel on behalf of others had been raging 
for decades by the time Smith read Rousseau. The principle point of antagonism was 
originally Thomas Hobbes’s infamous supposition that human beings were entirely 
selfish and incapable of genuine feeling on behalf of others. As he put it in Leviathan: 
Griefe, for the Calamity of another is PITTY; and ariseth from the imagination 
that the like calamity may befall himselfe; and therefore is called also 
COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present time a FELLOW 
FEELING: And therefore for Calamity arriving from great wickedness, the 
best men have the least Pitty; and for the same Calamity, those have least Pitty, 
that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.15 
This position was part-and-parcel of Hobbes’s denial of natural sociability. Once one 
dismissed Aristotelian notions of a zoon politikon, and also denied that human beings were 
capable of non-selfish affective sentiments directed towards others, then, as Hobbes put 
it in De Cive, human beings could form ‘large and lasting’ society only from the materials 
of ‘honour’ and ‘advantage’, i.e. from attempts to further utility, or out of the desire to 
secure recognition in the eyes of peers.16 Yet for Hobbes the interplay of honour and 
advantage was inherently unstable.17 The desire for unequal recognition (in Hobbes’s 
language, pride) overwhelmed efforts to live peaceably in order to secure utility and the 
mutual satisfaction of the need to be liked. As a result large and lasting society could not 
be stabilized from the materials of honour and advantage. The only solution was ‘fear’, 
i.e. the imposition of an over-aweing power to terrorize potential defectors into 
obedience, thus making large-scale society possible.18 
This vision was resisted by many of Hobbes’s British successors.19 Particularly 
important to Smith’s intellectual context, and certainly known to him, were Bishop 
Butler and Francis Hutcheson, who both drew upon the Earl of Shaftesbury’s anti-
Hobbesian ‘An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit’ to further attack the Hobbesian 
edifice. Butler’s 1726 Fifteen Sermon’s Preached at the Rolls Chapel argued directly against 
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Hobbes’s claim that human beings were incapable of genuine fellow feeling, offering a 
refutation of the supposition of necessary motivational egoism. 20  Butler similarly 
appealed to capacities for fellow feeling as providing the ‘cement’ to society, which he 
believed disproved the Hobbesian supposition of natural unsociability.21 Influenced by 
Butler, Hutcheson in his 1728 Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions invoked the 
idea of a ‘public sense’, which operated alongside his earlier idea of an innate ‘moral 
sense’ that disinterestedly detected virtue in others.22 This ‘public sense’ accounted for 
men’s capacity for fellow feeling, ‘our Determination to be pleased with the Happiness of 
others, and to be uneasy at their Misery’, which Hutcheson presented as giving the lie to 
Hobbesian and Mandevillean suppositions of irreducible selfishness. 23  Regarding 
sociability, Hutcheson’s 1730 inaugural lecture as Professor of Moral Philosophy at the 
University of Glasgow – where he would of course teach Smith in the late 1730s – 
invoked the idea of ‘sympathy’ (or in the original Latin, ‘contagio’) to offer a theory of 
natural sociability that was targeted at Hobbes, Mandeville, and Pufendorf.24 After these 
more major theorists, the now little-known Scottish philosopher Archibald Campbell 
offered a sophisticated reworking of Hobbes’s concept of pity, which he labeled 
‘sympathy’, in the 1733 reissue of his An Enquiry into the Original of Moral Virtue.25 
Most important of all, however, was David Hume. In his Treatise of Human Nature, 
published in 1739 and 1740, Hume supplied a complex theory of sociability rooted in the 
most advanced theory of fellow feeling yet deployed. Hume’s ‘sympathy’ posited that 
human beings literally shared each other’s sentiments, in his parlance transforming the 
‘idea’ of an other’s affective state into an ‘impression’. As he memorably put it in a 
metaphor later picked up and developed by Smith, ‘the minds of men are mirrors to one 
another’, reflecting passions back and forth. 26 Sympathy allowed Hume to block the 
Hobbesian supposition that pride destabilized the capacity to form society. On the 
contrary ‘Vanity is rather to be esteem’d a social passion, and a bond of union among 
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men’.27 Due to the capacity to sympathize with others, man was ‘the creature of the 
universe, who has the most ardent desire of society, and is fitted for it by the most 
advantages’. 28  But Hume did not maintain that man was therefore straightforwardly 
naturally sociable. The trouble came not from ‘honour’, as Hobbes had supposed, but 
‘advantage’. The pursuit of material interests led men into conflict, threatening to 
destabilize social arrangements because of the co-ordination problems generated by the 
instability of possessions combined with the limited generosity of men in conditions of 
moderate scarcity. Artifice was ultimately required in order for humans to achieve large 
and lasting society, but it was not that of overawing sovereign power, as Hobbes had 
supposed, or the invention of systems of morality and honour by legislator figures, as 
Mandeville claimed. Rather, it was the convention (and subsequently, virtue) of justice: a 
spontaneously developed, but artificial, response to the need to co-ordinate utility-
seeking across groups of self-interested, but nonetheless sympathetically-capable, 
individuals. Hume’s theory of justice was an ‘epicurean’ account of sociability, but one 
that hoped to avoid the licentious and scandalous implications associated with Hobbes 
and Mandeville.29  
There is no doubt that Smith knew Hume’s position intimately. Not only had he 
read the Treatise in detail whilst an unhappy visiting undergraduate at the University of 
Oxford, 30  but in the TMS he supplied a compact summary of Hume’s view, 31  and 
endorsed his central conclusion (albeit with technical modifications) that the organization 
of utility-seeking was the central sociability question, hence why justice was to be 
considered the ‘main pillar’ that upheld society, benevolence its mere ‘ornament’.32 The 
point of this for present purposes, however, is that compared to Hume’s complex 
position, Rousseau’s account of pity in the Discourse would have struck Smith as 
extremely basic, far behind the best English work available. 
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Rousseau’s position was that (as Smith put it in his review) pity was ‘in itself no 
virtue’33, but was more like an instinct, possessed by many animals as well as savage man 
in his primitive condition: ‘a natural sentiment which, by moderating in every individual 
the activity of self-love, contributes to the mutual preservation of the entire species’.34 
The central function of pity in Rousseau’s sociability story was to discredit Hobbes’s 
claim that in the state of nature man was naturally aggressive and violently competitive 
for status: ‘in the state of Nature’, pity ‘takes the place of Laws, morals, and virtue, with 
the advantage that no one is tempted to disobey its gentle voice; pity that will keep any 
sturdy Savage from robbing a weak child or an infirm old man of his hard-won 
subsistence if he can hope to find his own elsewhere’.35 Hobbes’s vision was a back-
projection of civilized man into his primordial state.36 The proof that it was a back-
projection, and a false one at that, was that it would have been impossible for men to 
ever group together long enough to escape their situation of primitive indolence if they 
were naturally aggressive in the way Hobbes supposed. Instead, Rousseau deduced, man 
had originally been solitary (Hobbes was right that there was no principle of natural 
sociability), yet nonetheless non-aggressive due to the possession of pity. He had 
ultimately entered society not by being overawed by superior power, but (as Smith 
summarized) because of some ‘unfortunate accidents having given birth to the unnatural 
passions of ambition and the vain desire of superiority’.37 Crucial to Rousseau’s story, 
however, was that natural pity was extensively suppressed after his amour propre – i.e. the 
desire for recognition – became pathologically inflamed due to contact with economic 
inequality and the rise of luxury.38 According to Rousseau, in modern conditions when 
pity was suppressed and amour propre was inflamed, yet amour de soi-meme – i.e. the material 
needs of the body – remained still active, the only materials human beings had to form 
society were, as Hobbes claimed, honour and advantage. Hobbes’s mistake was thinking 
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that human beings had always been like this. What he was not wrong about was how 
they were now. 
From Smith’s perspective in 1756 this story would have appeared far behind the 
advances achieved in Britain, by Hume in particular. Compared to the sophistication of 
Hume’s sympathy matrix, Rousseau’s pity was a very primitive notion. Furthermore, in 
order to explain the emergence and stability of large-scale societies, whereas Hume had 
his complex theory of justice, on top of which he grafted an account of allegiance rooted 
in affective sentiment which Smith himself directly picked up and extended, Rousseau 
posited the systematic deception of the poor by the rich after the point at which run-
away inequality and inflamed amour propre meant that the state of nature was left behind 
forever (something we shall return to below). And it is important to emphasize that in 
Rousseau’s story pity becomes fatally suppressed when humanity enters advanced large-
scale society. For although Rousseau dismissed Mandeville for failing to see that pity 
could be the source of natural virtue, i.e. criticizing the Dutchman for supposing that no 
natural virtue was possible at all, this was a very specific point. What Rousseau did not 
deny was that now, in conditions of modernity, with amour propre pathologically inflamed 
and when pity was extensively suppressed, most individuals did not act virtuously but 
only out of selfish regard to their own desire for recognition.39 Rousseau’s corrective of 
Mandeville was a technical point about the capacity for virtue amidst uncorrupted human 
beings, not a claim that pity enabled the widespread practice of virtue in the here and 
now. Yet when compared to Hume’s complex and detailed ethical theory – which took 
sympathy as its starting point, and which his 1751 Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 
made clear told decisively against theorists like Mandeville who denied the reality of 
moral distinctions due to suppositions of irreducible selfishness – Rousseau’s 
intervention cannot have struck Smith, despite its rhetorical power, as anything other 
than a variation on a theme that had already been surpassed.40  
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All of which throws into doubt Hont’s contention that there is a ‘direct imprint’ 
of Rousseau’s influence on the very first page of Smith’s TMS.41 Smith certainly declares 
that ‘However selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently principles in his 
nature which interest him in the fortune of others’ and gives ‘pity…the emotion which 
we feel for the misery of others’, as a prime example’.42 Yet rather than Smith here 
offering an endorsement, or continuation, of Rousseau’s basic insight, it is something like 
the opposite. Not only could Smith have taken the claim that we are capable of pity from 
a long line of previous British thinkers, he should anyway be read as saying that theorists 
like Rousseau are simply wrong. No matter how selfish we may be supposed, the 
principle of pity can ‘evidently’ be discerned in us, and not as a rarely encountered 
residue from an uncorrupted age, but as a quotidian fact of present existence. 
Furthermore, immediately after making this declaration in the first paragraph, Smith 
moves into a discussion of full-blown sympathy, expanding greatly beyond the 
rudimentary capacity of pity with which he opens. Explicitly taking over Hume’s term, 
and developing the older philosopher’s framework, Smith’s opening chapter laid the 
foundations of an account of sympathy which constituted a bold new intervention in the 
ongoing British debate. Ultimately, from Smith’s vantage point in Glasgow during the 
mid-1750s, Rousseau’s softened and embellished Mandevilleanism would have had 
nothing new or important to add to what had already been achieved in Britain. 
This of course raises the question of why Smith chose to review the Discourse at 
all. It is doubtful that we will ever have an entirely satisfactory answer. One suggestion, 
made in light of the above, might be that rather than seeing Smith’s ‘Letter’ as 
straightforward evidence of his interest in Rousseau, we might instead read it as 
something like an advertisement for his own forthcoming intervention. Smith may have 
been priming his readers: telling them that the interesting part of Rousseau’s thesis – the 
only thing that separates him from Mandeville – is the attempt to build a theory of 
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morality on the capacity for fellow-feeling. Rousseau hadn’t gotten it right, but Smith 
would soon offer his own, much more sophisticated, explication of how to do it 
properly. Admittedly this explanation is limited: an advertisement appearing three years 
before the advertised product has obvious drawbacks. But be that as it may, we are not 
entitled to assume that the mere fact of the review is by itself evidence for Rousseau’s 
influence upon, or importance to, Smith. To assume that is must be is to back-project 
contemporary estimations of these thinker’s respective importance, and invest the 
‘Letter’ with a meaning to Smith that we cannot know that it had. After all, motivations 
for reviewing the works of others are many and various: of those of us writing book 
reviews today, who would wish such things to be taken as a clear and unambiguous 
evidence of influence, or one’s estimations of importance, in two hundred and fifty years’ 
time? The fact is that we simply do not know why Smith reviewed Rousseau for his 
Scottish audience, and in light of that ignorance we ought not to assume that it clearly 
signals anything one way or the other. To arrive at an adequate judgment on the matter 
we must instead consider the wider evidence from Smith’s own published positions. 
 
Praise and Praiseworthiness 
Ryan Patrick Hanley has demonstrated that Smith’s central distinction between the love 
of mere praise, and the love of being genuinely praiseworthy, functions as a response to 
Rousseau’s claim that ‘commercial society is fundamentally driven by a vanity that 
threatens to corrupt its participants’. 43  According to Rousseau, ‘commercial society 
stimulates in men a desire for esteem and consideration such that they can only live in 
the eyes and opinions of others. Such individuals, plagued by solicitude for recognition, 
can no longer achieve the simple goodness natural to them in their uncorrupted, self-
sufficient state’.44 Living always in the eyes of others, men developed the distinction 
between being and appearing to be – between être and paraître – and in the process lost 
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the capacity for virtue, possessing only its simulacrum in the gratification of amour propre. 
Smith recognised this danger, but believed that it could be resisted. ‘To avoid such 
slavishness, nature invested man with a second side…in which the praises of others are 
mitigated by a natural regard for what is praiseworthy’. 45 Man desired not simply to 
appear virtuous, but to be virtuous. Indeed, Smith went so far as to claim that ‘so far is 
the love of praise-worthiness from being derived altogether from that of praise; that the 
love of praise seems, at least in a great measure, to be derived from that of praise-
worthiness’.46 As Hanley concludes, ‘Through the love of praiseworthiness, nature has 
supplied not simply a cure for an existing malady but an inoculation against an illness to 
come, for in a renewed appeal to our natural love of praiseworthiness lies what Smith 
takes to be the key to recovering virtue in civil society, and thereby returning civilized 
man from a concern with paraître to the love of être’.47 
I agree that Smith’s distinction between praise and praiseworthiness operates as a 
reply to Rousseau. But a philosophical argument may function effectively against a 
particular position without that position being the original intended target. Hanley takes 
it that Rousseau was indeed Smith’s original target. I believe the evidence points in 
another direction. 
Matters are complicated here by the fact that Smith’s most comprehensive 
discussion of the praise/praiseworthiness distinction was added at the very end of his 
life, to the sixth and final 1790 edition of TMS in the heavily revised and extended 
chapter 2 of Part III. At first glance it would appear that this is an area of Smith’s 
thought that cannot be posited as having been significantly formed prior to contact with 
Rousseau. Indeed, some commentators see the final edition as bearing indelible marks of 
the long-lasting influence of the Genevan. John Robertson, for example, has claimed that 
perhaps Smith’s most notorious final addition to the TMS – his claim that ‘The 
disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful’ is ‘the great and 
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most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments’48 – evidences Smith’s 
‘wrestling over his answer’ to Rousseau, ‘finally conceding the point’ that modern 
commercial society corrupts the individuals who must live within it.49 But we must be 
cautious here. With regards to the claim that excessive regard for the rich and the 
powerful corrupts our moral sentiments, Smith immediately states that this has been ‘the 
complaint of moralists in all ages’.50 If Rousseau is indeed the primary interlocutor, Smith 
is expressly denying his originality. And in what follows Smith actually paints a very 
different picture to that found in Rousseau’s thought. For whereas the Genevan depicts 
advanced society as a state in which pretty much all individuals are corrupted by the love 
of fame and fortune, and thus lose their natural capacity for virtue, Smith denies this. In 
the ‘middling and inferior stations of life’ the ‘road to virtue and that to fortune’ usually 
coincide.51 The real problem is a specifically and narrowly political one: that those in 
positions of power can be consistently materially rewarded for unethical behaviour, and 
are surrounded by flatterers who exacerbate the problem (two factors which do not hold 
in ordinary life). In other words, Rousseau’s general worry (if indeed he is even the 
target) about the ethical corruption of all individuals in advanced societies is misplaced 
and he misses the real issue: how rulers can be corrupted by their position, and what 
needs to be done, institutionally, to stymie and control that. This is not to suggest that 
Smith was therefore blasé about the potential for ethical corruption unleashed by 
inequality, the desire of material possessions, and the servility towards the rich and the 
great that the human predilection for sympathy with superiors generated. It ought to be 
clear to any reader of his texts that these matters concerned him deeply. The present 
point is a more limited one: that Smith held these concerns independent of his 
engagement with Rousseau, and the Genevan’s polemic cannot satisfactorily be viewed 
as a, let alone the, decisive spur to Smith’s concerns about moral corruption in 
commercial society.52  
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With regards to praise and praiseworthiness, although it is true that Smith’s most 
thorough articulation of this distinction only appeared in 1790, it can nonetheless clearly 
be identified in the earliest version of the TMS, to which the late addition refers when 
answering ‘Some splenetic philosophers’ who have ‘imputed to the love of praise, or to 
what they call vanity, every action which ought to be ascribed to that of praise-
worthiness’.53 This discussion is located in Part VII, and is trained explicitly upon the 
sceptical theory of Mandeville.54 
Part VII is the written-up version Smith’s student lectures on moral philosophy 
and the history of ethics, dating in part from his 1748-50 stint at Edinburgh, and 
thereafter from his appointment at Glasgow, first as Professor of Logic in 1751, then of 
Morals from 1752.55 Part VII is thus likely to be one of the oldest of the TMS, and what 
we find there is even more likely to predate Smith’s encounter with Rousseau than other 
sections of the book. And one thing we find is the distinction between praise and 
praiseworthiness being used to refute Mandeville’s ‘licentious’ system. As Smith puts it, 
‘Dr. Mandeville considers whatever is done from a sense of propriety, from a regard to 
what is commendable and praise-worthy, as being done from a love of praise and 
commendation, or as he calls it from vanity’.56 Against this Smith maintains that ‘the love 
of virtue’ is ‘the noblest and best passion in human nature’, and that even ‘the love of 
true glory’ whilst inferior to the love of true virtue, ‘in dignity appears to come 
immediately after it’.57 Men of real magnanimity will still desire to be praised for their 
virtues, but they are conscious that this is because their virtues are deserving of real glory 
and this holds even if they don’t actually receive the praise they are owed. By contrast, 
‘none but the weakest and most worthless of mankind are delighted with false glory’. 
Although Smith had not yet worked out the most powerful statement of his view as it 
would appear in the final additions to Part III, it is nonetheless clear in his 1759 rejoinder 
to Mandeville that a man of true virtue, who is unfortunate enough to be thought vicious 
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by his peers ‘Though he despises the opinions which are actually entertained of him, he 
has the highest value for those which ought to be entertained of him’. Although Smith 
admitted that only a very few robust individuals could live from praiseworthiness alone – 
most people needed frequent doses of psychologically-stabilizing praise to keep them 
going – he nonetheless took the possibility of living for praiseworthiness alone, and the 
admission of the legitimate enjoyment of praise for behaviour that was indeed 
praiseworthy, as refuting Mandeville’s claim that we only ever acted to selfishly secure 
our ‘vanity’.58 
Yet recognising that Smith employs the praise/praiseworthiness distinction in the 
first edition of the TMS implies a particular significance regarding his claim that 
Rousseau was a softened and embellished Mandeville. Recall that, according to Smith, 
Rousseau presented the same essential system as Mandeville, but without the apparent 
scandal and licentiousness of the earlier version, because Rousseau claimed that natural 
pity meant that we were not always incapable of virtue, as Mandeville provocatively 
claimed. Yet by the mid-1750s Smith already knew what he thought was wrong with the 
kind of debunking theory which posited that because we act out of a desire for 
recognition in order to satisfy amour propre – or as Mandeville termed it in the Fable of the 
Bees Volume 2, ‘self-liking59 – so all putative ethical behaviour is necessarily fraudulent or 
normatively compromised. This kind of argument could be defeated via the distinction 
between praise and praiseworthiness – and was originally worked out as a refutation of 
Mandeville. Certainly it operated pari passu against Rousseau. But that was because the 
Genevan was restating the same ideas as the Dutchman, albeit in a manner that 
deceptively made them appear to have all the ‘purity and sublimity’ of the ‘morals of 
Plato’.60 
Why, then, did Smith in 1790 offer an expanded and more thorough articulation 
of the praise/praiseworthiness distinction? We need not here posit the special or lasting 
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influence of Rousseau. Rather, the answer lies in the deep structure of Smith’s own 
ethical theory. As Hont encourages us to see, Smith’s theory of morals may be 
understood as an extension of the insight Hume had applied to justice, but to all of the 
virtues: their origin in repeat experience of social interaction.61 Hume divided the virtues 
into ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’, where the existence of the former was evidenced by 
immediate sympathetic responses to the imputed motivations of other agents, whilst the 
latter required some external convention to be in place before they could be made 
intelligible.62 Smith, by contrast, backed up the story to ask how it was possible there 
could be any virtues at all, even the putatively natural ones. This was a facet of the 
question of sociability: before one could examine the content of morality, one had to 
know where it came from – and that meant exploring the origins of society. This Smith 
did in Part III of TMS, where he offered a conjectural history of human ethical capacities 
as rooted in repeat iterations of judging and being judged over long periods of time. 
Morality, for Smith, was ultimately socially composed, an outcome of having to live in 
the gaze of others.63 
By doing this, however, Smith sailed much closer to Mandevillean shores than 
Hume. For the older Scott, precisely because there were ‘natural’ virtues antecedent to 
reflection, Mandeville’s claim that all moral virtue was fraudulent, in his notorious phrase 
merely ‘the Political Offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride’, could be 
straightforwardly dismissed.64 And Mandeville was also wildly off-target with regards to 
the artificial virtues: the manipulation of sociable behaviour by self-interested legislator 
figures mistook a secondary re-enforcement effect for a primary cause of sociability, 
which Hume instead located in the artifice of justice.65 Smith had to take Mandeville 
much more seriously because he essentially agreed with the Dutchman that the origins of 
all morality lay in repeat experiences of social interaction with judging peers. As Hanley 
writes, ‘insofar as sympathy is natural’, nonetheless ‘Smith seems to argue that it is 
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natural for our natures to be shaped by convention. But at the same time, Smith clearly 
foresaw the possible consequence of such an ethics if pursued to its conclusion – namely 
that an individual shaped by the morality of sympathy would be preeminently a slave to 
the strong need that men have for the approbation of their fellows’.66 This explains why 
Smith could write that ‘how destructive soever’ Mandeville’s system might appear, ‘it 
could never have imposed upon so great a number of persons, nor have occasioned so 
general an alarm among those who are the friends of better principles, had it not in some 
respects bordered upon the truth’.67 This was an assessment Hume would never have 
countenanced, but which Smith did because his own account of the foundations, if not 
the normative validity, of morals travelled along much more similar lines to Mandeville’s 
than Hume’s had done. 
The praise/praiseworthiness distinction was required to secure the possibility of 
genuine virtue in a world where ethical practices and values were ultimately a function of 
deep-rooted conventions of social interaction – of judging others and being judged in 
turn – whilst equipped with the capacity to share each other’s sentiments. Smith needed 
such a distinction to prevent his own theory from collapsing into the sceptical debunking 
genealogy of Mandeville’s ‘licentious’ system. By 1790 he judged that his earlier attempts 
had not adequately or most powerfully explicated what separated him from Mandeville. 
Yet Smith’s felt need to make good on his arguments was a product of the demands 
incumbent upon his own system, given his unwavering commitment not to cede the field 
to Mandeville, instead consistently denying that a socially-composed origins theory of the 
foundations of morals must therefore be a sceptical or debunking one. As a result, 
Rousseau featured not as a source of any great influence or intellectual threat, but as 
merely repeating a challenge that Smith had already long-registered, and knew that his 
own position needed to address. 
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Utility and Deception 
I turn now to Part IV of the TMS, where Smith directly paraphrases Rousseau’s 
arguments from the Discourse. Surely here we can discern the latter’s profound influence 
upon the former? I suggest not. The reasons are revealed by paying close attention to 
Smith’s wider purposes and strategy of argument.  
Part IV is primarily a response to Hume’s claim, stated in the Treatise and 
repeated even more forthrightly in the second Enquiry, that a regard for utility is the 
dominant factor in explaining value judgements. According to Hume, Smith reminded 
his readers, the ‘utility of any object…pleases the master by perpetually suggesting to him 
the pleasure or conveniency which it is fitted to promote’, with spectators able to share 
in this pleasure via sympathy. 68  Despite the initial plausibility of this account Smith 
insisted that it was subtly and importantly mistaken. In fact, human psychology exhibited 
a pervasive and wide-ranging quirk, such that the ‘fitness, this happy contrivance of any 
production of art, should often be more valued, than the very end for which it was 
intended’. Bizarrely – at least, to a sober philosophical eye – ‘the exact adjustment of the 
means for attaining any conveniency or pleasure, should frequently be more regarded, 
than that very conveniency or pleasure, in the attainment of which their whole merit 
would seem to consist’. 69 Smith took himself to be the first to have noticed this yet 
pointed to a multitude of everyday examples to prove its truth: the man who expends 
much effort arranging the chairs in a room to achieve an order which costs him more in 
convenience than is gained by having the floor clear; the person who is excessively 
curious about watches and rejects one model on the grounds that it loses two minutes in 
a day, replacing it with a much more expensive one that only loses a minute in a 
fortnight, despite both being perfectly adequate for the basic function of telling the time; 
he who adores ‘trinkets of frivolous utility’ and walks about ‘loaded with a multitude of 
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baubles’ which cost him more inconveniency to constantly carry about than can ever be 
gained from having them to hand.70 
Taken alone these examples would constitute little more than a simple 
refinement of Hume’s account. But Smith’s next case – that of ‘The poor man’s son, 
whom heaven in its anger has visited with ambition’ – opened up the deeper 
implications.71 It is vital to recognise that the poor son in Smith’s example is not primarily 
motivated by amour propre. One might expect Smith to suggest that a desire for esteem 
and status underlies such ‘ambition’, especially in the context of his having read both 
Mandeville and Rousseau, and what he himself appears to say in TMS Part I. Indeed this 
is how he is usually interpreted. Hanley writes that ‘Smith in his own name advances the 
claim originally made in his translations of the Discourse: that markets are driven by 
solicitude for praise and recognition, and that such dependence on the esteem of others 
is also the source of the corruption of all our moral sentiments’. 72  Jerry Z. Muller 
similarly states that for Smith ‘The dominant motive for engaging in economic activity – 
beyond providing for one’s bodily needs – is the non-material desire for social status’.73 
Hont likewise claims that Smith ‘rehearsed’ Hume’s point that continuous consumption 
of material goods beyond the point of needs-satiation was not simply about utility but 
about the ‘beauty of their design that pleased their owners’, but he nonetheless concludes 
that ‘Smith conceded Rousseau’s case, also describing the hectic culture of status seeking 
as a giant deception’.74 These readings, however, subtly misconstrue Smith’s argument.75 
For it is categorically not status recognition that does the central work in Smith’s 
account, at least in Part IV. The ‘love of distinction so natural to man’, he tells us, is at 
best only a secondary consideration in explaining the human tendency towards luxury 
consumption. The primary factor is the quirk of human rationality Smith takes himself to 
be the first to have identified. The poor man’s son feels his daily inconveniences and 
compares those to what he imagines are the pleasure of the rich, afforded to them by 
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their many devices for promoting utility. Whereas he must walk, they ride in carriages; 
whereas he must labour for all his wants, they have a retinue of servants. The poor son 
sees these conveniences and imagines that because they are fitted to promote pleasure 
they therefore make the rich happy – and that if he had them, then he too would be 
happy. Accordingly, the poor son becomes ‘enchanted with the distant idea of felicity’, 
and devotes himself to the endless ‘pursuit of wealth and greatness’. But the outcome is a 
paradox: the poor son spends his life toiling to achieve wealth as a means of securing 
instruments of pleasure, and in the process expends far more effort, and incurs far more 
inconvenience, than could ever be compensated for by the riches he manages to amass. 
‘Through the whole of his life he pursues the idea of a certain artificial and elegant 
repose which he may never arrive at, for which he sacrifices a real tranquility that is at all 
times in his power’. The situation ends in irony: because the poor son is enchanted with 
the idea of utility-promotion rather than utility itself, he will never achieve the levels of 
wealth that he thinks will make him happy. Such levels are constantly receding from him 
due to the very quirk of human psychology that makes him pursue the imagined means 
of pleasure rather than solidly attainable pleasures themselves. In old age such a man may 
finally come to see, with regret and bitterness, the error of his ways: that ‘wealth and 
greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility, no more adapted for procuring ease of 
body or tranquility of mind than the tweezer-cases of the lover of toys’. But by then it 
will largely be too late, and he will realise that he has wasted most of his life in chimerical 
pursuits.76  
It is important to recognise, however, that Smith’s poor man’s son is an extreme 
example. He is not supposed to represent how all people typically think and behave, but 
merely illustrates, in acute and dramatic form, those tendencies that are much less 
pronounced in ordinary well-adjusted people. Smith did not deny that the condition of 
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the rich and the great received widespread admiration, and that this forwarded the desire 
of ordinary people to themselves become rich and great. However: 
If we examine…why the spectator distinguishes with such admiration the 
condition of the rich and the great, we shall find that it is not so much upon 
account of the superior ease or pleasure which they are supposed to enjoy as of 
the numberless artificial and elegant contrivances for promoting this ease or 
pleasure. He does not even imagine that they are really happier than other 
people: but he imagines that they possess more means of happiness. And it is 
the ingenious and artful adjustment of those means to the end for which they 
were intended, that is the principle source of his admiration.77 
Yet matters are complicated by the fact that Smith appears to take a much more 
Rousseau-like position in TMS Part I. He there writes that ‘To be observed, to be 
attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all 
the advantages which we can propose to derive’ from ‘that great purpose of human life 
which we call bettering our condition’. Indeed, Smith even seems to contradict what he 
later says in Part IV, declaring that ‘It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which 
interests us’.78 This passage is what commentators seem to have in mind when they claim 
that Smith concedes Rousseau’s claim about amour propre as the underlying driver of 
material consumption beyond bare necessity. But we must read carefully. The context of 
these passages is Smith’s claim that ‘mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely 
with our joy than our sorrow’, where he follows Hume’s view that we tend to love and 
esteem, rather than hate and envy, the rich and powerful.79 Yet Smith’s ‘vanity’ is not 
Rousseau’s amour propre. The notes of the Discourse specified amour propre to be ‘a relative 
sentiment…which inclines every individual to set greater store by himself than by anyone 
else, inspires men with all the evils they do one another’.80 In contrast to this, what Smith 
claims in TMS Part 1 is that individuals pursue riches because observers sympathize with 
the pleasure that the rich ought to receive from their wealth, and this in turn augments 
the pleasures the rich themselves expect from their material affluence.81 ‘The rich man 
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glories in his riches, because he feels that they naturally draw upon him the attention of 
the world, and that mankind are disposed to go along with him in all those agreeable 
emotions with which the advantages of his situation so readily inspire him’.82 According 
to Rousseau we primarily desire riches to rub other people’s noses in our superiority: ‘the 
ardent desire to raise one’s relative fortune less out of genuine need than in order to 
place oneself above others, instills in all men a black inclination to harm one 
another…and always the hidden desire to profit at another’s expense’.83 For Smith, by 
contrast, we pursue riches to augment the pleasures that wealth brings by the added 
pleasure that arises from having others themselves take pleasure, via sympathy, in our 
prosperous condition. Hence ‘that emulation which runs through all the different ranks 
of men’ is not a zero-sum game of brute status competition, but a complex product of 
the capacity to share each other’s sentiments, made in the context of Smith’s central 
claim that having other people agree with our sentiments via sympathy is inherently 
pleasurable.84 
The difference between Smith and Rousseau is ultimately pronounced. The 
Discourse postulated that a figure like the ‘poor man’s son’ was motivated primarily by 
competitive amour propre in a zero-sum competition for status (and inevitably so since pity 
had been fatally suppressed, meaning that men could only compete with each other not 
share each other’s sentiments). Furthermore, following the introduction of private 
property and the advent of inequality, the poor man’s son was not the extreme, but the 
archetype, of how corrupted human beings behaved in contemporary conditions. Smith 
rejected both these claims. The desire for riches and greatness, and the admiration of the 
rich and the great, were primarily motivated not by the competitive seeking of 
recognition in the eyes of peers, but by two other features of human psychology. First, 
the quirk which encouraged men to value the means of utility-promotion more than 
utility itself. Second, the propensity, via sympathy, to take pleasure not in the actual 
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pleasures of the rich, but in the pleasures one imagined that they ought to take (even if 
they in fact didn’t) from their possessions, and in turn the pleasure, via sympathy, that 
the rich themselves took from knowing that others took pleasure in observing their 
condition. Yet this view was one that Smith arrived at through a correction of Hume’s 
ideas, both with regards to the quirk of rationality regarding utility as explicated in Part 
IV, but also with the claim that individuals pursue luxuries to augment their pleasures as 
a function of Smith’s central contention that ‘mutual sympathy pleases’ – the very aspect 
of Smith’s system that Hume labeled its ‘hinge’, but believed to be a mistake.85 Insofar as 
Rousseau was also answered, that was a secondary effect, and one that in any case 
essentially addressed a vision of the motivations behind luxury consumption that had 
already (and notoriously) been stated in Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees Volume 1 as long 
before as 1714. 
This brings us to the question of the role of deception in human psychology, 
where Smith is often read as (in Hont’s phrase) ‘conceding Rousseau’s case’. This is not 
an accurate construal. First of all, we need to be clear that there are two metrics of 
deception in play when we compare Smith and Rousseau. The first relates to the matter 
we have just been discussing: the psychological processes underpinning market activity 
and the pursuit of material, and especially luxury, goods. What should already have been 
established is that Smith did not ‘concede’ Rousseau’s case in this regard. Whereas the 
Genevan posited that market activity was driven by an irreducibly competitive desire for 
superior status – luxury was both the focus of amour propre, and pathologically inflamed it 
– Smith claimed that the majority of material appropriation beyond the satisfaction of 
bare necessity was the result of a product of the quirk of our rationality when it came to 
estimating pleasures, their means of attainment, and the corresponding connection to 
happiness. Smith certainly described this as a deception – but it was not the one that 
Rousseau supposed. 
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The second metric along which the notion of deception may be considered 
relates to how economic inequality, arising from market interactions and the rise of 
luxury, interacted with the basis of political power in large-scale advanced societies. 
Rousseau’s claim in the Discourse was that the rich originally tricked the poor into 
accepting the property rights that formalized and entrenched material inequality, fooling 
them into believing that this would be to their own advantage. ‘All ran toward their 
chains in the belief that they were securing their freedom; for while they had enough 
reason to sense the advantages of a political establishment, they had not enough 
experience to foresee its dangers’. 86  The ‘deception’ therefore amounted, as Michael 
Rosen has noted, to a form of false consciousness.87 Smith entertained no such thing, 
and opted to follow Hume’s alternative in locating the stability of large-scale political 
societies in a theory of natural authority. Although it’s full sophistication and power has 
long lain obscured from modern readers, Book 3 of Hume’s Treatise contained a detailed 
theory of allegiance rooted in what his later essays called the ‘opinion of mankind’.88 
Thanks in part to sympathy’s ensuring that ordinary people tended to admire and esteem 
the rich and powerful, men typically deferred to the authority of their rulers, initially out 
of utilitarian self-interest, but eventually – and as was typically the case in stable and 
advanced societies – out of a belief in the rightfulness of the political authority they 
found themselves living under. Certainly, significant abuses of power led to the forfeiture 
of the basis of allegiance with regards to (in Smith’s later phrase) ‘utility’ and ‘authority’.89 
But in ordinary circumstances human beings did not need to be deceived in order to live 
under conditions of material and political inequality, instead spontaneously submitting to 
established modes of authority.90 
Smith certainly knew Hume’s account of natural authority – indeed he spent 
much of his working life attempting to extend and improve it. The TMS offered a 
compact endorsement of the thesis as the basis of political rule when explaining ‘the 
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distinction of ranks, and the order of society’,91 whilst Book V of the Wealth of Nations 
would offer a more developed analysis of the psychological foundations of natural 
authority than Hume ever supplied, 92  and what are now known as the Lectures on 
Jurisprudence featured a sustained attempt to supply a historically grounded political theory 
organised around natural authority and the opinion of mankind.93 The point of this for 
present purposes is that with Hume’s theory already in hand, Rousseau’s false 
consciousness explanation of the basis of advanced political society would have struck 
Smith as crude and anyway redundant. Indeed, it would have looked rather like 
Mandeville’s claim that society was founded in the systematic manipulation of the weak 
and stupid by the powerful and cunning. Which is exactly what Smith stated in his 1756 
review, where he wrote that both Rousseau and Mandeville held that the ‘laws of justice, 
which maintain the present inequality amongst mankind, were originally inventions of 
the cunning and the powerful, in order to maintain or to acquire an unnatural and unjust 
superiority over the rest of their fellow-creatures’.94  
With these wider matters in focus we can now appreciate the proper context and 
import of Smith’s paraphrasing of Rousseau in TMS Part IV. As is well known, Smith 
claimed that with regards to the ‘deception’ underlying the pursuit of material goods ‘it is 
well that nature imposes upon us in this manner. It is this deception which rouses and 
keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind’.95 Echoing Rousseau’s rhetoric from 
one of the passages of the Discourse that he had translated for readers of the Edinburgh 
Review, he continued: 
It is this which first prompted them to cultivate the ground, to build houses, to 
found cities and commonwealths, and to invent and improve all sciences and 
arts, which ennoble and embellish human life; which have entirely changed the 
whole face of the globe, have turned the rude forests of nature into agreeable 
and fertile plains, and made the trackless and barren ocean a new fund of 
subsistence, and the great high road of communication to the different nations 
of the earth.96  
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Although it was the designs of the rich for their own pleasure that originally stimulated 
much economic activity, the paradoxical outcome was to improve the lot of all, as 
market-consumption stimulated demand and the rising tide of economic productivity 
lifted all boats.97 As Hont notes, by making this move Smith firmly aligned himself with 
Locke and Mandeville, and against Rousseau, in the tradition of thought that held that 
the division of the world into unequal propertied holdings was on balance justified 
insofar as the result of the economic activity such inequality stimulated made the worst-
off vastly better off than they could have been if the earth remained communally owned 
and yet uncultivated.98  
But let us now put all of the pieces together. Smith is typically read as first 
conceding Rousseau’s fundamental case about the way markets are driven by competitive 
amour propre and in turn tend to corrupt participants through processes of deception, but 
then offering, as a consolation, and via what Hont terms a ‘rudimentary theodicy’, the 
beneficial effects this deception had in terms of the overall gains to mankind.99 But this is 
not right. Smith’s deployment of Rousseau’s rhetoric takes place in a discussion whose 
primary target is Hume’s theory of utility, and where Smith did not endorse the 
‘deception’ that Rousseau posited, either with regards to the personal pursuit of luxury, 
or the basis of political societies exhibiting high levels of material inequality. In Part IV 
Smith located the primary ‘deception’ that gave rise to property, productivity, market-
exchanges, and eventually large-scale inequality, not in the desire for recognition – and 
not even in his own, sympathetically-modified, account from Part I – but in the quirk of 
human rationality regarding utility-seeking he took himself to be the first to have noticed. 
In other words, both the premises and the conclusions of Rousseau’s case were mistaken. 
The more general point for present purposes is that in seeing this we can also appreciate 
that rather than Rousseau being Smith’s primary target in Part IV, he featured as 
something more like collateral damage. Once Hume’s account of utility was properly 
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corrected to make the central ‘deception’ in human psychology the quirk of rationality 
with regards the means rather than the ends of pleasure, Smith could in passing also 
explain what was wrong with the recent polemic from the continent, recycling the key 
passages he’d translated in his earlier review to this effect. In this case, one prominent 
thinker’s paraphrasing of another corresponds to their marginal, rather than central, 
importance. 
The extent to which Smith’s own view of the ‘deception’ that lies behind 
economic consumption is darkly pessimistic, or perhaps ultimately more sanguine than 
might be supposed, is a matter requiring further interpretation. 100  But whatever the 
outcome of that question, we should recognise Smith’s intervention for what it was. A 
new innovation, self-consciously moving beyond Hume’s earlier framework of 
combining the capacity for sympathy with regard for the effects of utility, that was 
neither a concession to, nor an adoption of, Rousseau’s Mandevillean emphasis on bare 
competitive amour propre as the primary motor of economic activity. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite what might reasonably be supposed, and is indeed assumed in the much of the 
existing literature, when Smith read Rousseau’s Second Discourse he did not register it as 
the work of a particularly important or challenging interlocutor. As a result, the influence 
of Rousseau upon Smith is at best minimal and secondary. One reason for this, I have 
tried to suggest, is that it is a mistake (even if an understandable one) to assume that 
because the Discourse was published in 1755, and the TMS in 1759, and because both 
survey much of the same or similar terrain, that they must therefore share the same 
intellectual context.101 As Robin Douglass’s recent work has shown, Rousseau’s sources 
were relatively limited when he was developing his ideas. When it came to the debate 
over sociability he effectively worked out of the French translation of De Cive, and 
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contemporary French criticisms of Hobbes and Pufendorf of extremely varying reliability 
(as well, presumably, as the French translation of Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees available 
after 1740).102 That Rousseau could write the Discourse from such materials makes his 
achievement, if anything, that much more impressive. But Smith was a more fortunate 
genius. Not only did he have greater access to published works than Rousseau, first as a 
student and then as a teacher in a university setting, but he was also the inheritor of long-
standing British debates that Rousseau could not access. In particular, Smith was able to 
read and absorb Hume’s revolutionary contributions in the light of which Rousseau’s 
Discourse must have paled severely, as I have tried to indicate above. 
The case I have mounted here is principally internal to the history of political 
thought: an attempt to identify proper lines of influence and reception, themselves 
revealed by, but also furthering, alternative lines of philosophical interpretation. Yet what 
is at stake is not merely historical. We should certainly agree with Hont that Smith and 
Rousseau be read as theorists of how large-scale politics can operate in a world of 
market-interactions that yield material, social, and political inequalities that need both to 
be made intelligible to those subject to them, and be stable enough to prevent the 
collapse of the systems of exchange and opulence that generate them in the first place. 
Inequality is today very much back at the heart of political debate and popular concern. 
Although the gap between developed and developing nations is shrinking, disparities of 
wealth within developed nations have increased dramatically and consistently over the 
past three decades. 103  If the argument of Thomas Piketty’s recent surprise bestseller 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century is correct, this is no accident.104 That absent the unusual 
political circumstances of the past hundred years – in particular two world wars and the 
presence for several decades of powerful competitor ideologies to liberal democratic 
capitalism – the twenty-first century is much more likely to resemble the nineteenth than 
the twentieth, because when left unchecked and free from political interference, 
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capitalism tends to concentrate wealth, reinforcing and expanding existing inequalities. If 
that is indeed so, then questions of how much inequality market-based societies can bear, 
whilst remaining stable both politically and economically, are likely to come once again 
firmly to the fore. In looking for insights into how to theorize – and maybe even address 
– the predicaments of capitalist inequality, Smith and Rousseau may represent attractive 
starting points. But in picking up their texts today, separated by 250 years of historical 
change and many varieties of intellectual amnesia, we must not assume that they simply 
started from the same place, or can be read as on an equal footing. That Smith was 
apparently unmoved by Rousseau’s diagnosis of the predicaments of commercial 
societies invites us to consider whether we ought likewise to be cautious of using the 
Genevan as a guide, and whether the Scot offers a more advantageous point of departure 
from which to try and make sense of our difficult present. 
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